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Abstract
Can deceitful intentions be discriminated from truthful ones? Previous work consistently
demonstrated that deceiving others is accompanied by nervousness/stress and cognitive
load. Both are related to increased sympathetic nervous system (SNS) activity. We hypoth-
esized that SNS activity already rises during intentions to lie and, consequently, cues to de-
ception can be detected before stating an actual lie. In two experiments, controlling for
prospective memory, we monitored SNS activity during lying, truth telling, and truth telling
with the aim of lying at a later instance. Electrodermal activity (EDA) was used as an indica-
tor of SNS. EDA was highest during lying, and compared to the truth condition, EDA was
also raised during the intention to deceive. Moreover, the switch from truth telling toward
lying in the intention condition evoked higher EDA than switching toward non-deception re-
lated tasks in the lie or truth condition. These results provide first empirical evidence that in-
creased SNS activity related to deception can be monitored before a lie is stated. This
implies that cues to deception are already present during the mere intention to lie.
Introduction
Most of the research on physiological detection of deception has focused on the act of lying, and
contrasts specific statements that are either truths or lies [1,2]. These studies build on the fact
that there are consistent differences in the physiological response of the sympathetic nervous
system when lying or when telling the truth [2–4]. However, categorizing statements as either
truths or lies neglects that deception may take a variety of forms, ranging from its most direct
form, fabrication, to more subtle forms including half-truths, vagueness, equivocations, and
concealments [5]. This implies that deception and lying, although used interchangeably, reflect
essentially different constructs. Deception refers to “[. . .] a deliberate attempt to create in anoth-
er a belief which the communicator considers to be untrue” [6]. A lie is defined as intentionally
making a false statement [7]. Thus, whereas deception refers to a process, lying refers to a specif-
ic strategy that can be used during this process. This is an important notion because deceivers
tend to stick to the truth as much as possible [8] and to only lie on crucial aspects [9,10].
Theory and empirical data emphasize that lying is cognitively and emotionally taxing [11].
Previous work demonstrated, for instance, that brain areas associated with cognitive processes
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such as working memory and executive control are more active when lying compared to telling
the truth [12–15]. Also, feelings of nervousness and stress may accompany lying [16,17], which
can be related to different emotions [18]. These differences are reflected in increased sympa-
thetic nervous system (SNS) activity [2–4].
The aim of the current research is twofold: First we examine whether SNS activity, associat-
ed with deception, already can be observed in stages wherein one is telling the truth but does
has the intention to lie at a later moment. Second, we examine how SNS activity is affected by
moving from a mere intention to deceive to a stage wherein one—in order to keep up their de-
ceptive intentions—actually will be required to lie.
Truth telling with the intention to lie: Can SNS activity, related to
deception, be detected before a lie is stated?
Previous work consistently demonstrated that lying is cognitively and emotionally taxing [19].
Research shows that brain areas associated with cognitive processes such as self- and other
monitoring, working memory, and executive control, are more active when lying compared to
telling the truth [12–15]. Also, feelings of nervousness and stress frequently accompany lying
[16,17]. Based on earlier research [2,4,20–23], we therefore expect SNS activity to be higher
during lying compared to truth telling (Hypothesis 1).
Moreover, SNS activity may already rise before lying, but when having the intention to de-
ceive. Intention refers to a mental representation of planned actions (in this case the aim to de-
ceive others), based on some amount of reasoning and planning [24]. Therefore, many of the
cognitive processes needed for lying may already be active during the intention to deceive. This
may, for example, reflect monitoring processes related to concerns to appear consistently hon-
est and not to give away cues to deception when switching from truth telling to lying [25,26].
Also, arguably, people may already feel nervous and stressed in the foresight of lying and not
just at the moment of lying itself.
Some first evidence that the intention to deceive can be measured, can be found in studies
which have tried to separate the ‘act’ of deception from the ‘intention’ to deceive by using a
delay in subjects’ answers [22,27–29]. These studies monitored SNS activity while people gave
honest and deceptive answers to questions. SNS activity was increased during deceptive an-
swers compared to truthful ones. Even more importantly, SNS activity already increased in the
time interval between the question and the answer. In the short moment between question and
lying, arousal thus already increased when anticipating lying.
This previous work, however, focused on a single snapshot of the specific moment that peo-
ple are lying. The current research goes above and beyond these findings by approaching de-
ception as an ongoing process. To do this we make a distinction between the anticipation and
action stage during the process of deception. That is, deceptive interactions for a part exist of
an anticipation stage in which one has the intention to deceive others but is telling the truth be-
cause the content of the interaction does not require lying yet. Only a specific part of the inter-
actions exist of an action stage involving interactions that require straightforward lies in order
to deceive the other. We predict that increased SNS activity due to the intention to deceive al-
ready can be detected in such anticipation stages wherein one is telling the truth but has the in-
tention to deceive when necessary (Hypothesis 2).
Moreover, cognitive load and stress caused by preparing to lie should become most taxing
when moving to the action stage—when the necessity for lying increases. Also, switching be-
tween tasks in itself is known to cost effort [30]. Therefore, we assume that the switch from the
anticipation stage toward the action stage especially increases SNS activity (Hypothesis 3).
Deceptive Intentions
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0125237 May 27, 2015 2 / 17
The current research
We developed a new paradigm to examine the entire process of deception, contrasting the
mere intention to deceive with pure truth telling and lying. Traditionally studies investigating
deception contrasted specific truthful statements with lies [2,4,22]. However, such an approach
makes it impossible to capture the processes associated with the mere intention to deceive, be-
cause intention related processes occur simultaneously with lying processes. In the current
work we therefore not just compare SNS activity during lying and truth telling, but also during
truth telling with the intention to lie on a later moment.
Moreover, previous studies demonstrated that adding a double task significantly improves
the chances of observing cues to deception due to cognitive processes associated with deception
[31–34]. A secondary task increases participants’ cognitive demand and impedes the act of de-
ceiving which is also cognitively demanding. This leads to a poorer deception performance and
hence more cues to deception [31]. Although studies in the field of deception detection used a
variety of double tasks [31–34], studies studying cognitive processes more in general often use
arithmetic double tasks [35–37]. In Experiment 1 we used an emotion recognition task, be-
cause, while deceiving, people constantly had to read facial expressions to assess whether they
were believed or not [38,39]. In Experiment 2 we used a more traditional, arithmetic
double task.
In both studies, we measured electrodermal activity (EDA) as an indicator for SNS activity
[40,41]. EDA is an index for both stress [42–44] and cognitive load [45–48] (Please note that
some studies tried to discriminate stress from cognitive load in EDA [78]. However, usually
stress and cognitive load are correlated [79] and difficult tasks (such as deceiving) can induce
both [80].). An important advantage of using EDA is that its signal is discriminable, meaning
that changes in sympathetic nervous system activity can be detected with one single measure-
ment [41]. Therefore, it is an often-used measure method in field studies with applied relevance
[49–52] and the most frequently used physiological measure by scholars and practitioners in
the field of deception [53]. An EDA signal measured over time consists of an overall, slow drift-
ing signal, overlaid by short fluctuations, called skin conductance responses [40]. The slow
drifting signal is called tonic EDA and indicates the overall conductivity of the skin over long
time intervals of about ten or more seconds [54]. The overlaying fluctuations are referred to as
phasic EDA, and are particularly sensitive for short local fluctuations in SNS activity [54,55]. It
is therefore likely that tonic EDA will be most suited for comparing longer stages of truth
telling—with and without the intention to lie—with those of constantly lying (Hypothesis 1
and 2). Phasic EDA in turn will be especially sensitive to brief changes in arousal, and therefore
to measure the switch from anticipation toward action stage (Hypothesis 3).
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Fifty students from a Dutch University participated in the experiment. All
subjects provided written informed consent and the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Behav-
ioral Sciences of the University of Twente approved the experimental protocol. Due to technical
failures in measuring skin conductance, three participants were removed, leaving 47 participants
for statistical analyses (mean age = 21.01 years, SD = 2.28, range = 18–29 years; 21 women).
Experimental design
Blocks. The experiment consisted of three within-subject conditions (lie/truth/intention
to lie), and was built up from nine successive blocks (3 lie blocks, 3 truth blocks and 3 intention
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blocks), presented in a random order. We used three different sequence versions to control for
habituation effects. Every block was divided into an anticipation and an action stage, each con-
sisting of three trials with a question (therefore each block consisted of six trials). In the action
stage one of the three questions was colored blue (the order of the blue questions was counter-
balanced).
In the truth blocks participants were instructed to answer truthfully on all six trials, and in
the lie blocks participants had to lie on all six trials. In the intention blocks, participants were in-
structed to answer truthfully on all trials except for the critical trial (with the blue colored ques-
tion). Because the blue question never occurred in the anticipation stage, this stage served as
basis to measure truth telling with the intention to lie. The blue question always occurred in
one of the final three question trials of the block, hence this stage is referred to as action stage.
Important to note is that in the truth and lie blocks participants additionally were instructed
to say ‘blue question’ when the blue colored question appeared. This instruction created an ex-
pectation regarding the blue questions in all blocks, not just the intention blocks. Electrodermal
activity (EDA) differences between the intention, lie and truth blocks therefore are not simply
due to anticipation or occurrence of a neutral event (the blue question), but can be attributed
to the anticipation of lying. The trial position of the blue question was unknown to
the participant.
Trials. Participants first saw the stimulus window for 5 seconds, containing a face, a relat-
ed Yes/No question to that face and a double task. The face stimuli were selected from the Rad-
boud Faces Database [56]. In order to increase external validity, we randomly used faces from
males and females, Caucasian and non-Caucasians, as well as from adults and children. The
question always referred to a face characteristic (e.g., “Does this person have blue eyes?”). Next,
the answer window appeared for 6 seconds. During these 6 seconds participants were asked
first to give a full verbal answer to the question (which could be a lie or truth, depending on the
block) and then to give the solution to the double task. After the answer window, a white screen
appeared for 9 seconds before a new trial began. A trial included a stimulus, a response and a
pause (see Fig 1).
Double task. Monitoring others’ emotional expressions is an important aspect during de-
ceiving in order to assess whether one is believed or not [38,39]. We constructed the task as
such that the face stimuli expressed one of the most recognized emotions across cultures:
anger, fear, sadness, disgust, happiness, contempt or surprise [57]. In six blocks, an emotion oc-
curred only once. However, to prevent learning effects, in two blocks one emotion occurred
Fig 1. Trial structure. Every trial lasted for 20 seconds. During the first 5 seconds (Screen with stimulus) three objects were shown: a face, a Yes/No
question about a face-characteristic and a double task. Then a response window was shown for 6 seconds. In these seconds participants first answered the
question and then solved the double task, both orally. Finally, a white screen appeared for 9 seconds before a new trial started.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0125237.g001
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twice and in one block one emotion occurred three times. Across all 54 trials, sadness occurred
nine times, happiness and anger eight times, fear six times, disgust eleven times and contempt
four times. Participants were instructed to say aloud the emotion that they saw. An example of
these trials can be found in Fig 2. In half of the blocks, the facial expression to be recognized
Fig 2. Double task example. Panel A shows an excerpt from Experiment 1 and panel B shows an excerpt
from Experiment 2. Both contain two trials, consisting respectively of a question window (duration: 5 seconds)
and answer window (duration: 6 seconds). At total each block consisted of 6 such successive trials from
which one is colored blue. Whether participants responded with lying or saying ‘blue question’ on the blue
question depended on the condition (lying, truth, intention). The two experiments differed with respect to their
double task. The double task in Experiment 1 consisted of an emotion recognition task. In the excerpt from
panel A participants were expected to say aloud ‘Happy’ and ‘Surprised’, after having answered the question
(e.g., ‘Yes, this person is a woman. Happy’). The double task in Experiment 2 consisted of an arithmetic task.
In the excerpt from panel B, participants were expected to say aloud ‘2’ and ‘4’ after having answered the
question in the answer window (e.g., ‘Yes, this person is a woman. Two’).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0125237.g002
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was morphed with the neutral face expression of the same face (The original design also con-
tained a between-subject factor, task difficulty. However, analyses with this variable did not
render any significant main or interaction effects. We suspect that the difference between the
conditions was not strong enough and we therefore eliminated this factor from further
analyses.).
Procedure. Participants were instructed to answer blocks of six questions. We informed
them that with each question a face would be shown to which the questions would be related,
for instance a question about hair color. We told them that preceding each block they would
get the instruction to lie, tell the truth on all questions, or just to lie on the blue colored ques-
tion. We informed them that in case they got the instruction to tell the truth or lie on all ques-
tions, they had to say aloud ‘blue question’ as soon as they encountered a blue question. We
also instructed them to say aloud the emotion they recognized in that face after they had an-
swered the question.
Participants completed one practice block consisting of six trials in the presence of the ex-
perimenter who ensured that participants followed the instructions. Then the experimenter left
the room and the experiment started. Participants received no feedback about their perfor-
mance, neither on the double tasks, nor on truth telling and lying. The experiment lasted
26 minutes. To increase the participants’motivation and involvement in the task, we awarded
a prize money of 100 € and 50 € respectively to the ‘best and second best liar’. We also told par-
ticipants that an expert in lie detection observing their responses via a webcam (a camera was
placed next to the monitor so it was visible for the participants) would make this judgment (In
reality, the money was allotted among the participants after the experiment).
.
Measures
Electrodermal activity as indicator for sympathetic nervous system activity. Using EDA
has several advantages over other physiological measures: It directly reflects activity of the sym-
pathetic nervous system (SNS) without being affected by parasympathetic activity [40,58]. Its
signal is distinctive, can be measured unobtrusively and can be detected after one measurement
[41]. Because we were interested in long lasting processes (monitoring and preparing) as well
as short lasting events (the switching between a stage of truth telling and a stage where a lie
takes place), we chose to base our analyses on tonic as well as phasic EDA.
Tonic versus Phasic EDA. In EDA research, differences are made between tonic and pha-
sic EDA, which both can be extracted from the raw EDA data [40,55]. EDA measured over a
period of time consists of an overall and relatively slow drifting signal on which there are short
fluctuations, called skin conductance responses (SCRs) [55,59,60]. The slow drifting signal is
called tonic EDA and indicates a more general level of arousal over a longer time interval [54].
The SCRs are sensitive for short phasic localized fluctuations in arousal [40].
Tonic EDA. Tonic EDA is modulated by chronic stimuli over a longer time interval [41].
Traditionally there are two ways of computing tonic EDA. First, one can average all measure-
ments points distributed across the time window of interest, leaving out the measurement points
during the SCRs [40]. By omitting the SCRs, a stable and slowly adapting/changing signal is left,
not distorted by spontaneous events [55]. Another method is to measure characteristics of the
SCRs observed in the time window of interest, for example the frequency or total amplitude of
the SCRs [55]. SCRs reflect the higher-frequency variability of the entire signal [54].
Because we are interested in SNS activity during longer time periods of truth telling and
lying, tonic EDA is suitable for comparisons between the three conditions. Tonic EDA in-
creases at any task performance. Even more important, the anticipation alone of any task will
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increase tonic EDA [41]. So, it can measure differences (if present) between truth telling with
and without a deceptive intent, which do not differ in task (truth telling) but in anticipation (ei-
ther lying or not on an upcoming question).
Phasic EDA. Since phasic EDA is based on SCRs, it is more sensitive to the abrupt, short-
lived changes. This makes it a good candidate in our experiments to measure the switch from
an anticipation stage (e.g., truth telling) to an action stage (where e.g., a lie takes place) within
a condition.
Computing tonic EDA and phasic EDA. Establishing tonic and phasic EDA from one
continuous EDA signal often bears difficulties. One of these difficulties is that SCRs often over-
lap and therefore lose their typical form of a sharp phasic peak. That makes it difficult to tear
apart the slow changing tonic EDA from its overlaying SCRs [40]. We used a method by Bene-
dek and Kaernbach [60] which controls for this problem, called the Continuous Decomposi-
tion Analysis (CDA). It returns the raw EDA data into a continuous tonic and phasic signal
(the overlaying SCRs). Therefore a multi-step deconvolution approach is applied, based upon a
physiological model of the SCR shape. The continuous phasic signal is expressed as time inte-
grated area under the SCR and measured in μSs. The continuous tonic signal is measured
in μS.
Because of the slow fluctuations, tonic EDA is suitable for comparisons between the three
conditions. Since phasic EDA is based on SCRs, it is more sensitive to the abrupt, short-lived
changes when for example switching from anticipation (e.g., truth telling) to acting (e.g., lying)
within a condition. Both hypotheses were tested on tonic and phasic EDA. Based on the nature
of these two signals we expect to find a stronger pattern of effects for Hypotheses 1 and 2 (over-
all patterns) in tonic EDA and for Hypothesis 3 in phasic EDA [41].
Recording EDA. EDA was measured exodermal (constant voltage) using skin conduc-
tance sensors (Thought Technology Ltd., Montreal West, Quebec, Canada), attached to the dis-
tal phalanx of the right index and ring fingers [55]. The signal was amplified and recorded
using a ProCompInifiniti system (Thought Technology Ltd.). Continuous Decomposition
analysis was executed using MATLAB custom code from Ledalab [60].
EDA Parameter settings. EDA was recorded at 256 Hz and down-sampled to 16 Hz (well
above the 10 Hz after which increases in sample frequency do not significantly alter the EDA
parameters) (Benedek and Kaernbach [60] proposed that EDA does not change above a sample
rate of 16 Hz. We verified their statement by analyzing the data with 64 Hz. Our results howev-
er remained the same.). Parameters were computed with continuous decomposition analysis
(CDA). We used a minimum amplitude threshold criterion of .01 μS [55] and iterated the pa-
rameter optimization three times. The skin conductance was separated into a continuous tonic
and phasic signal, each containing 54 trials per subject.
EDA Time window. SCRs usually have a delay between one and four seconds [55]. Fig 3
shows the mean course of raw EDA, phasic EDA and tonic EDA during a trial (20s) per condi-
tion. As can be seen, skin conductance rises about two seconds after stimulus onset. Therefore,
we chose a time window ranging from 2 till 13 seconds after stimulus onset (the question), en-
compassing the moment the question is presented and the moment the answer has to be given.
Our statistical analyses based on tonic EDA (μS) and phasic EDA (μSs) in this time window.
As recommended by Boucsein [55], EDA was normalized by taking the natural logarithm. Sta-
tistical analyses were performed on log-transformed data, but the reported descriptive statistics
were based on the raw data (phasic EDA in μSs; tonic EDA in μS). The data on which our sta-
tistical analyses were performed can be found in S1 Dataset (Experiment 1) and S2 Dataset (Ex-
periment 2).
Deceptive Intentions
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Dependent Variables
In deception-detection paradigms it has been established that in a set of trials, the first trial re-
sults in atypical EDA fluctuations (e.g., the Guilty knowledge test; [53]). Therefore, we removed
the data of the first question trial in a block, leaving two question trials in the anticipation stage
and three question trials in the action stage. We tested Hypotheses 1 and 2 on basis of the antic-
ipation stage. The switch from the anticipation stage toward the action stage enabled us to ex-
amine the switch from a stage of truth telling with the intention to lie, toward a stage where a
Fig 3. Mean EDA during a trial.We separated raw skin conductance data (A) into a continuous signal of phasic EDA (B) and tonic EDA (C). The graphs
present the mean course of skin conductance during a trial (20 s) per condition. The left panel shows EDA for Experiment 1 and the right panel shows EDA
for Experiment 2. Both show the same course pattern. For the statistical analysis we used an interval from 2 till 13 seconds (dotted lines). To separate the raw
signal into its components, continuous decomposition analysis (CDA) by Benedek and Kaernbach (2010) was used. It is important to note, that phasic EDA is
mapped in μS. However, the phasic EDA was time integrated in a later stadium of the CDA analysis. This means that the unit finally changes into μS*s.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0125237.g003
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lie occurs. We let the blue question occur on a random trial position within the action stage to
control for learning effects. Therefore, when contrasting the switch from the anticipation to-
ward the action stage, we do not refer to the direct switch to a single trial with the blue question
but to the switch to the stage that included the blue question. For the statistical analyses we re-
port partial eta square (ηp
2) as effect size measure. This effect size measure usually is used in
ANOVAs and explains the proportion of variance of an effect that is not explained by other
variables in the analysis [61].
Results
Cognitive load during the intention to lie. Our first aim was to compare truth telling
with the intention to lie with ‘honest’ truth telling and lying on tonic EDA. Therefore we com-
pared the anticipation stage, which spanned the time before the blue question occurred, be-
tween conditions. To test our hypotheses we conducted a repeated measures analysis with
within-subject factor condition (intention to lie/lie/truth) on tonic EDA (which should be espe-
cially sensitive for longer term changes in SNS activity) of the anticipation stage. In addition,
we also report the results for the phasic EDA.
Supporting our prediction, we found a main effect of condition on tonic EDA for the antici-
pation stage, F(2, 92) = 24.95, p< .001, ηp
2 = .35. Simple effect analyses revealed that EDA in
the lie condition (M = 4.30, SE = .41) was significantly higher compared to the intention
(M = 4.07, SE = .39), t(46) = 5.85, p< .001, and truth condition (M = 4.04, SE = .39),
t (46) = 5.36, p< .001. The difference between truth telling with and without the intention to
lie was not significant, t(46) = 0.85, p = .399. We repeated the same ANOVA analysis for phasic
EDA within the anticipation stage and found no main effect of condition, F(2, 92) = 0.66,
p = .518, ηp
2 = .01.
These results supported Hypothesis 1: as expected, lying evoked higher tonic EDA than
truth telling. Hypothesis 2, however, was not supported and EDA levels in the intention condi-
tion were comparable to the levels in the truth-telling condition. This implies that compared to
straightforward truth telling, participants’ SNS activity was not higher when telling the truth
while preparing for lying. Lastly, we did not find reliable differences over conditions for phasic
EDA levels. This is in accordance with the previously explained idea that phasic EDA is more
sensitive to short-lived changes compared to ongoing processes.
Cognitive load during the switch from the intention to lie toward lying. Our third pre-
diction was that phasic EDA shows the largest increase from anticipating toward action stage
in the intention condition. Here, participants switch from truth telling with the intention to lie
toward a stage where a lie occurs. To rule out that this effect can be attributed to prospective
memory (that is, remembering to do something at a particular time [62]), we compared the
switch from the anticipation toward the action stage between the three conditions. We concep-
tualized the rise in cognitive load as EDA difference between the anticipation and action stage.
In line with this, we subtracted EDA activity of the anticipation stage from the action stage
within all conditions. We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA using as within-subject fac-
tor EDA rise (Intention diff, Lie diff, Truth diff) on phasic and tonic EDA. However, the effect of
EDA rise on phasic EDA, F(2, 92) = 1.87, p = .159, ηp
2 = .04, nor on tonic EDA, F(2, 92) = 1.39,
p = .255, ηp
2 = .03, were significant. The increase of phasic EDA thus did not differ between
conditions and Hypothesis 3 therefore was not supported.
Discussion
Using a new paradigm, we replicated earlier findings, demonstrating that lying evokes higher
EDA than truth telling [2,4,20–23]. We found this effect on tonic EDA by comparing stages of
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constant lying with those of constant truth telling. This is in line with the notion that tonic
EDA captures arousal over a long time interval whereas phasic EDA is sensitive to short local-
ized fluctuations in SNS activity. However, we could not confirm our expectation that truth
telling with the intention to lie evokes higher EDA than sincere truth telling. Also, the switch
between the anticipation and action stage was not different for the three conditions.
The first aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate Experiment 1, using a different double task.
Dual-task interference appears when there is not enough cognitive capacity to process a sec-
ondary task on top of the primary task [63]—in our case lying and having the intention to lie.
Recognizing expressions plays a role during deception [38,39], and hence an emotion recogni-
tion task could interfere with deceptive intent. However, in Experiment 1 we found no differ-
ence between the truth and intention conditions. For Experiment 2 we therefore chose a
traditional arithmetic double task that has proven empirical ability to exacerbate (subtle) differ-
ences in cognitive processing demands of various experimental conditions (e.g., [35–37]). In-
stead of recognizing an emotion, participants had to solve a sum now. Except for the double
task, the Method of Experiment 2 was precisely the same as that of Experiment 1.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants. Forty-seven new students from a Dutch University participated in the exper-
iment. All subjects provided written informed consent and the experimental protocol was ap-
proved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Behavioral Sciences of the University of
Twente. Due to technical failures in measuring skin conductance, one participant was removed,
leaving 46 participants for statistical analyses (mean age = 20.88 years, SD = 1.82, range = 18
through 27; 25 women).
Double task. For the arithmetic double tasks we chose the same face stimuli as in the emo-
tion recognition task [56]. However, this time the face stimuli had a neutral expression with
‘printed’ dots on it (range: 1 to 6 dots). The printed dots served as basis for the ‘arithmetic’ dou-
ble task. In half of the blocks, these dots had to be added or subtracted with a number between
one and six and in the other half of the blocks to be multiplied with a number between seven
and 27 (see Fig 2). Again, each time the correct answer had to be said out loud. Participants re-
ceived no feedback about whether they solved the sum correctly.
Procedure. The same procedure as in Experiment 1was applied with only one difference:
The instruction about the double task. Participants completed one practice block consisting of
six trials in the presence of the experimenter. We informed participants that the faces con-
tained a number of “freckles”. On basis of these freckles they would have to solve a sum, for in-
stance “Number of freckles plus two”. We instructed participants to say aloud the answer to
the sum after they answered the question about the face.
Results
Cognitive load during the intention to lie. An ANOVA with within-subject factor condi-
tion (intention to lie/lie/truth), showed, as in Experiment 1, a main effect of condition on tonic
EDA for the anticipation stage, F(2, 90) = 18.53, p< .001, ηp
2 = .29. Simple effect analyses re-
vealed that EDA in the lie condition (M = 5.28, SE = .60) was significantly higher compared to
the intention (M = 5.01, SE = .55), t(45) = 3.73, p = .001 and truth condition (M = 4.93,
SE = .55), t(45) = 5.09, p< .001. Moreover, different from the results of Experiment 1, but in
line with Hypothesis 2 the results showed that, compared to the truth condition, EDA in the in-
tention condition was significantly higher, t(45) = 2.69, p = .010.
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We repeated the ANOVA for phasic EDA within the anticipation stage and again found a
main effect of condition, F(2, 90) = 3.60, p = .031, ηp
2 = .07. Simple effect analyses revealed that
EDA was significantly higher in the lie (M = 2.98, SE = .40), compared to the intention condi-
tion (M = 2.61, SE = .35), t(45) = 2.37, p = .022, but not compared to truth condition (M = 2.80,
SE = .38), t (45) = 1.31, p = .196. The difference of EDA between the intention and truth condi-
tion was not significant, t(45) = 1.64, p = .107.
In line with Hypothesis 1, and the results of Experiment 1, we found that tonic EDA was
highest during lying. Moreover the results of Experiment 2 provided support for Hypothesis 2
as well. Compared to the truth telling condition, EDA was already elevated when participants
had the intention to deceive, but were not required to lie yet. As expected, this difference was
found when using the tonic but not the phasic EDA-data.
Cognitive load during the switch from the intention to lie toward lying. Similar to Ex-
periment 1, we conducted a repeated measures ANOVA using as within-subject factor EDA
rise (Intention diff, Lie diff, Truth diff) on phasic and tonic EDA to compare the switch from the
anticipation toward the action stage between the three conditions. We found a main effect of
EDA rise for phasic EDA, F(2, 90) = 4.22, p = .018, ηp
2 = .09 (see Fig 4). In support of Hypothe-
sis 3, simple effect analyses following the ANOVA revealed that the EDA rise within the inten-
tion condition (M = 0.54, SE = .10) was significantly higher compared to that in the lie
condition (M = 0.31, SE = .12), t(45) = 2.13, p = .038, and truth condition (M = 0.18, SE = .12),
t(45) = 2.50, p = .016. EDA rise did not differ between the lie and truth condition, t(45) = 1.21,
p = .232.
For tonic EDA we found a marginal significant main effect of EDA rise, F(2, 90) = 3.06, p-
= .051, ηp
2 = .06. Simple-effect analyses revealed that the rise was highest in the intention to lie
condition (M = 0.07, SE = .02), and that this significantly differed from the rise in the lie condi-
tion (M = .03, SE = .01), t(45) = 2.45, p = .018, but not in the truth condition (M = .07, SE =
.02), t(45) = 0.13, p = .896. EDA rise did not significantly differ between the lie and truth condi-
tion, t(45) = 1.88, p = .066.
We could support Hypothesis 3 for Experiment 2: The switch from anticipation toward ac-
tion stage on phasic EDA was highest in the intention condition. For these results the patterns
Fig 4. The switch from the anticipation to the action stage. The figure displays the switch from the
anticipation to the action stage. Experiment 1: Mean rise in phasic EDA (with standard errors within
parentheses) for the truth, lie and intention condition were 0.25 (0.14), 0.17 (0.14), 0.45 (0.15) respectively.
Experiment 2: Mean rise in phasic EDA (with standard errors within parentheses) for the truth, lie and
intention condition were 0.18 (0.12), 0.31 (0.12), 0.54 (0.10) respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0125237.g004
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of the phasic EDA were clearer than those of the tonic EDA. This is in line with the notion that
phasic EDA is sensitive for brief changes in SNS activity [54,55].
General Discussion
While over the past decades studies have been comparing lying and truth telling to detect cues
to deception [26], our study is the first to find evidence that deceptive intent alone can contain
cues in terms of increased SNS activity. In two experiments we tested whether the intention to
deceive can be discriminated in terms of SNS activity from both truthful as well as entirely de-
ceptive accounts. Using skin conductance (EDA) as an indicator for SNS activity, our results
demonstrate that psychophysiological measures contain markers that may discriminate honest
and deceitful intentions even before a lie is stated.
Similarly to previous studies we have found higher SNS activity during lying than truth tell-
ing [2,4,20–23]. In reality deceivers often alternate between truth telling and lying in order to
present a believable story, and stick to the truth most of the time [8–10]. This implies that a
great part of deceptive attempts exist of truth telling with the intention to lie. The current study
complements the field of deception detection by moving one step further than simply contrast-
ing lies with truth, and showing that truth telling with the intention to deceive in itself may
evoke higher SNS activity than ‘sincere’ truth telling. These findings are in line with earlier
studies, which have shown that SNS activity already increased in the short interval between a
question and given lie [22,27–29]. We, in contrast, focused on the intention to deceive before
the need for a specific lie emerges. By doing so we were able to study deception as an ongoing
process and demonstrate that lying is a crucial, but short element of the deception process. Fur-
thermore, we found that particularly the switch from truth telling with deceptive intention to-
ward an action stage involving a straightforward lie evokes higher EDA than switching toward
an action stage requiring giving a non-deceptive statement.
We do have to note that the results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 differed to some
extent. Specifically, the prediction that truth telling with the intention to deceive increases
EDA compared to sincere truth telling was supported by the results of Experiment 2 but not by
Experiment 1. Interestingly, EDA differences between the conditions seemed to become more
in line with our predictions when using an arithmetic double task compared to an emotion rec-
ognition double task, especially with regard to truth telling with and without the intention to
lie. Because we used these double tasks in two independent studies, we can only speculate why
the arithmetic double task may have interfered more with the intention to lie and hence, in-
creased the difference between truth telling with and without the intention to lie. A reason
could be that, for instance, the mental operations needed to solve the equations are qualitatively
different from emotion recognition. Solving an equation may need mental operations that are
stretched in time whereas emotion recognition takes place within a brief moment. Also, an as-
signment to solve equations may be more concrete than emotion recognition, which could
have led participants to focus more on solving the sum than on emotion recognition. Future re-
search could systematically manipulate types of double tasks to further investigate which type
of task is best suited to increase the chance of observing cues to deception during the intention
to deceive.
It is most likely that the elevated EDA-levels during lying and the intention to lie observed
in the present research are indicators for increased arousal, and are caused by stress and cogni-
tive load. There is an abundance of research demonstrating that EDA rises with both stress/
nervousness [42,43] and cognitive load [45–48,64]. Some studies found that EDA actually de-
creases with task difficulty [65,66]. Ikehara and Crosby [65] for instance, compared an easy
and difficult task and found, contrary to their expectations, that the latter induced lower EDA.
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Interestingly they ascribed their findings to the task design and speculate that the easy task was
too easy and tedious, and therefore could actually be more stressful than the difficult task. It is
therefore likely that in these studies increased EDA was a result of increased emotional arousal
rather than decreased cognitive load.
It is well-known that lying requires cognitive processes unique for lying, such as suppressing
the truth while making a counterfactual statement [67,68]. However, the current work suggests
that SNS activity may already increase during the mere intention to lie. We therefore propose
that some cognitive processes relevant to lying, such as self-monitoring and lie preparation, al-
ready may be relevant during truth telling with the intention to lie. An important avenue for fu-
ture research therefore may be to investigate what kind of processes underlie the increase in
SNS activity during lying and/or the intention to lie.
Research on the behavioral correlates of deception show that particularly high-stakes lies
(often occurring in real-life) are associated with intense emotions [69], while relatively low-
stakes lies (in experimental studies such as the current studies) are typically associated with
cognitive load [26,69]. On the one hand, because the topic of deception in the present research
concerned relatively low-stakes, it may be less likely that strong emotions such as guilt or anxi-
ety were aroused in the current paradigm. On the other hand, because participants were led to
believe that a lie expert would judge them and that best two liars would receive a monetary
prize, it is likely that deceiving was accompanied by excitement to fool the lie expert. This so
called ‘duping delight’ [70] could have resulted in elevated EDA during lying and the mere in-
tention to lie compared to truth telling as a result of emotional arousal as well. It would be in-
teresting to investigate how stakes moderate the type of processes (cognitive versus emotional)
causing an increase in EDA.
Limitations and future research
When further developing the current paradigm, we advise to take into consideration several
points. In the present work we decided to remove the first of six trials in a block, leaving two
trials in the anticipation and three trials in the action stage. Herewith we aimed to prevent that
atypical fluctuation commonly seen in the first trial of a set trials distorted our data [53]. Im-
portantly, the different lengths of the two stages should not be problematic for the current find-
ings. Both stages have the same lengths across the three conditions and also, we took the
average of the trials within the stages. However, for follow-up studies we advise to expand on
the number of trials in order to create anticipation and action stages of equal length. Also
through adding more trials, a post action stage could be built in. The latter would be interesting
in order to measure the reversed switch from lying toward truth telling.
We further should point out that the design of these studies was not optimized to examine
the switch from truth telling toward lying within an attempt to deceive. Originally, the para-
digm was designed to measure truth telling with the intention to lie. To be able to compare the
anticipating stages for all three conditions, we took trial 1–3 as the anticipation stage, because
the blue question never occurred before the 4th trial. The blue question occurred on different
trials within the action stage in order to prevent that the moment to lie would become predict-
able for participants. Ideally we would have analyzed the switch from the anticipation toward
the blue question separately for the blocks on trial level. However, unfortunately our data set
was too small to run these analyses while having sufficient statistical power. We therefore took
the average of trial 4, 5 and 6 as the action stage. We realize that in some instances the blue
question occurred at the very end of this phase. However, because it was clear that each block
only had 6 trials, even in these cases participants would already be triggered and ready for
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action in the fifth trial. We therefore encourage future research to examine the switch from
truth telling toward lying on trial level.
Generally, it would be interesting to design follow-up research that replaces the face stimuli
with real humans to create a dynamic face-to-face interaction. This could generate more inter-
personal monitoring processes, because the deceived person is the person checking one’s credi-
bility. Also, a real person’s facial expression is not static and therefore monitoring a real
person’s face may induce more long-lasting interference with lying/the intention to lie than the
face recognition of static faces (as this was the case at the emotion-recognition task in Experi-
ment 1).
Conclusion
The present findings suggest that the current scientific discourse surrounding lie detection
might have been approached too dichotomously. First, lie detection research usually differenti-
ates between lying and truth telling, which resonates in well-known deception detection meth-
ods. For instance, the Comparison Question Test [71] measures different physiological
parameters and compares them on Yes/No answers that could either be a lie or the truth [72].
Second, looking at lies and truths in isolation does insufficiently take into account that decep-
tion is a ‘process in which someone tries to create in another a belief which (. . .) is untrue’ [73].
Creating such a belief can be achieved through different means. Arguably crucial is the inten-
tion to deceive someone, which underlies the entire attempt to deceive [10], including lying
and truth telling parts. And third, the findings add to an upcoming field in deception detection
research: The ability to discover lies about future intentions [74]. In line with the dichotomous
focus on lying, most research in this new area examines whether a particular statement about
the future is truthful or not [75–77]. We would suggest that, also for this field, investigating de-
ception as an ongoing process would provide a valuable alternative approach.
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